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European Business Cases The EU Climate and Energy Package and E.ON: A two-step response to a disruptive policy 
Alisa AKUTSINA1, David RINALDI2 & Thibault ROY3
Abstract 
This business case analyses why and how E.ON reacted to the EU climate regulations 
and to the changing environment of the European energy market. In December 
2008 the European Parliament adopted the EU Climate and Energy Package to 
significantly decrease greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and to promote 
renewables. The overcapacity on the market and the drop of wholesale price of 
electricity hit traditional oil, gas and coal energy utilities such as E.ON. The fast 
development of renewables also impacted the market structure. Faced with a 
disrupted market, E.ON carried massive losses. This business case analyses the 
corporate answers to this profoundly changing environment, from 2008 more 
common responses to E.ON’s drastic decision to split in two firms in 2014.  
1 Analyst, International Operations Directorate, National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 
2 Research Fellow, Energy Climate House, CEPS 
3 Academic Assistant, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe and corresponding 
author: thibault.roy@coleurope.eu 
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1. Introduction
In December 2008, the European Parliament adopted the final version of the EU 
climate and energy package. This package sets three rather ambitious goals which would 
determine relevant changes for energy markets: 1) 20% reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, 2) 20% increase in energy efficiency and 3) 20% increase in renewables 
consumption by 2020. Targets set at EU level had to be matched by national targets, with 
national governments often increasing subsidies for renewables such as wind and solar 
power. These policy changes, together with other relevant extra-European policy and 
technological changes brought about a deep transformation in the European and global 
energy markets4. Against this backdrop, most of the largest energy producers in Europe, 
faced major financial losses and their business and corporate strategies were 
questioned. 
This business case outlines the strategic response of E.ON, one of the largest 
European utility companies, to the changing environment and illustrates how the 
corporate strategy adapted to the new European policy and regulatory environment. To 
withstand all the turbulences, the company’s management first decided to opt for strong 
but somehow conventional measures such as i) lobbying the national governments and 
the European Institutions, ii) increasing investment in renewables, iii) expanding to more 
attractive emerging markets and iv) implementing cost-cutting measures. This set of 
actions was intended to help the company keep its competitive positions in the EU; but 
E.ON decided shortly after to go one step further and split the company business in two
parts: one continuing with the conventional business model and one focusing on
disruptive technologies.
The paper is structured as follows: the remaining of Section 1 introduces E.ON in 
the context of the European energy market; Section 2 presents the relevant EU policy 
changes and their impact on the industry and on E.ON. In Section 3, we outline the 
company response to the new policy and industry environment, first by highlighting the 
more conventional measures, followed by the more radical ones. In Section 4 and 5, we 
4 On top of the new EU policy framework, also the Chinese policy change towards subsidies for photovoltaic 
generation and the progress made in the USA on batteries’ capacity are also to be considered key game 
changer for energy producers. 
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present our concluding remarks and a set of questions which can help class debates and 
reflective learning.    
1.1.  The power sector in the EU and E.ON 
The EU power sector had been dominated for decades by a few national or 
regional electricity utilities, in particular by the “big five”: EDF, GDF-Suez (both France), 
E.ON, RWE (both Germany) and ENEL (Italy). 
These companies relied on conventional sources of energy (mainly coal, natural 
gas and nuclear) to generate electricity. 
 
Figure 1 – Power production in the EU in 2007, by energy source 
 
Source: Eurostat (2012) 
 
E.ON was one of the world's largest investor-owned electric utility. In both 2007 
and 2008, E.ON was ranked the second electric utility globally in terms of financial 
performance5. Its business model was to operate along the entire energy value chain: 
generation and production of gas and electricity, transmission, trading, distribution and 
retail sales. It was thus a major player on the market. 
                                                 
5 Platts Annual Survey, Global Energy Company Rankings, which measures companies' financial 
performance using four metrics: asset worth, revenues, profits, and return on invested capital.   
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One third of its power generation capacity was located in Germany, the rest being 
located mainly in other EU countries (the UK, the Nordic countries and Central Europe).6 
According to the 2009 Company Report, as reported in Figure 2, at end of 2009, E.ON 
power plants ran mainly on nuclear fuel, gas and coal.7 
Figure 2 – E.ON Energy capacity in 2009, by energy source 
Source: Company Report (2009) 
2. The EU energy and climate package and its impact
2.1.  Policy objectives and instruments 
The beginning of 2007 marked a major change in the EU’s energy and climate 
ambitions. The Commission’s proposal for the coordinated changes in the energy sphere 
was backed by the European Parliament and supported by the Member States at the 
European Council. This led to the adoption in December 2008 of the EU 2020 Climate 
and Energy Package, which consists of a set of binding legislations necessary to meet the 
following targets: 1) a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions below the 1990 
levels or a 30% reduction if the similar international agreements are achieved; 2) a 20% 
6 E.ON Annual Report (2010), p. 13. 
7 E.ON Annual Report (2009), p.11. 
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increase of the renewable energy share in the total energy consumption; 3) a 20% 
reduction in energy consumption – improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency.8 
 It was the biggest step made by EU institutions to switch to a low carbon and 
greener economy. Since then, promoting low carbon technology has been increasingly 
prioritised and has become one of the main EU priorities and a key objective for the 
coming decades. 
On January 22, 2014 the European Commission presented the new framework 
for Energy and Climate to update emission targets until 2030. The new main targets were 
a reduction in GHG emissions by 40% below the 1990 level (instead of the 20 % of the 
2020 package), an EU single binding target for the share of the renewables consumption 
of 27% minimum, as well as renewed ambitions for energy efficiency policies, a new 
governance system and a set of new indicators to ensure a competitive and secure 
energy system9. 
Fuels consumed for power generation cause most of GHG emissions, more than 
emissions caused by the transportation sector or deforestation and agriculture.10 
Despite the difficulty to precisely evaluate the distribution of emissions between sectors, 
experts agree that the power sector has, for the EU, the biggest potential for cutting 
emissions.11 
Decarbonising the supply side means diminishing the power generation share of carbon-
emitting technologies (coal and gas power plants mainly) and increasing the share of low-
carbon ones, in particular renewable energy sources.  
A key instrument to reduce GHG emissions was supposed to be the EU Emissions Trading 
System (ETS), which covered more than 40% of the region’s emissions, mainly power 
plants and factories. 
In addition to the EU ETS, the European Commission pushed for accelerating the 
transition to renewable sources. According to the at-the-time EU Energy Commissioner 
                                                 
8 European Commission (2008), Climate change: Commission welcomes final adoption of Europe's 
climate and energy package, press release IP-08-1998. 
9 European Commission (2014), 2030 Climate and Energy Goals for a Competitive, Secure and Low-
Carbon EU Economy, press release IP-14-54.  
10 IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report. 
11 See for instance H. Weight, E. Delarue and D. Ellerman (2012), CO2 Abatement from Renewable 
Energy Injections in the German Electricity Sector: Does a CO2 Price Help?, TME Working Paper.  
 
9 
Günther Oettinger “renewables are a solution to global climate change, European 
economic growth, and security of supply issues”12. Member states adopted supporting 
schemes for renewables to comply with the Energy and Climate Package. The 2009 
Renewable Energy Directive in particular set specific country-by-country targets ranging 
from 10% to 49%13 (see Annex 1). These support schemes have a different modus 
operandi, but all-in-all most measures consisted in various forms of public subsidies to 
renewable generation. For Germany in particular, where about a third of E.ON 
generating capacity is located, the new European policy framework was strongly 
supported by the federal government. In 2010, Germany legislated several measures for 
the Energiewende (energy transition) and set ambitious national targets: a renewable 
energy target of 60% and 80–95% GHG reductions by 2050, relative to 1990. The total 
amount of subsidies for renewables in Germany for the year 2012 was around €20bn and 
peaked at about €24bn in 2014.  
An additional tool employed to boost renewable energy production at the 
European level was the “grid priority”. Transmission and distribution system operators 
are faced with the legal requirement of taking electricity from renewables first. 
2.2.  Impact on the energy sector 
The years 2008 to 2014 were very challenging for the EU energy sector. On top of 
the global financial crisis, which induced a significant decrease of the energy demand and 
therefore a reduction of electricity prices, energy producers had to face a changing 
regulatory environment and the transformation of the energy value chain. The planned 
functioning and implementation of the 2020 Energy and Climate Package and the 2009 
Renewable Energy Directive negatively affected the cost-effectiveness of existing 
conventional fossil fuel power plants and thus the profits of electric utilities.  
Notwithstanding the specificities of support schemes to renewables across 
Europe, they had one main outcome: a massive increase in generation from renewables, 
12 European Commission (2013), Renewable Energy: Commission refers Austria to Court for failing to 
transpose EU rules, press release IP-13-1113. 
13 European Commission, Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources, published on 23 April 2009. 
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which originated an over-generation of electricity and thus induced a drop in wholesale 
prices.   
 The presence of non-market-based support to renewable production 
contributed to widening the gap between wholesale electricity prices and power costs; 
the gap proved to be wide enough to squeeze some highly efficient gas power plants out 
of the market   in favour of solar and photovoltaic generation of electricity. 
As the marginal cost of wind and solar power approaches zero, economically speaking, it 
is rather intuitive to give access to the grid to renewables first. Nevertheless, given 
that solar and wind power are intermittent, the supply of energy from renewable is 
volatile and difficult to predict. Nuclear or fuel-fired power plants cannot easily reduce 
their production to respond to a peak of supply from renewables and are not profitable 
unless they work on large scale.   
Besides its impact on wholesale prices and therefore on the profitability of 
different energy portfolios, the EU push for renewables also accelerated a 
transformation of the market structure.  In fact, the European energy market, and the 
German one in particular, started transforming from an oligopoly of few suppliers into a 
splintered market in which a potentially endless set of small players also generate power, 
thanks to subsidised and new technologies. That constitutes not only a difficult 
conjuncture but rather a challenge to the established business model of utilities. 
2.3.  Impact on E.ON 
As mentioned, in 2009 E.ON’s energy production relied primarily on nuclear, gas, 
and coal, with only 13% of its production from renewable resources, i.e. hydro, wind and 
solar. The company was therefore in a position where subsidies to renewable energy 
could not offset the losses from conventional power generation.  
In line with the impact undergone by the whole industry, the main negative 
effects that E.ON had to face in the aftermath of the implementation of the new 
European energy and climate policy framework were a substantial profit and market 
value loss. The loss was primarily due to: 
• A contraction of the output from conventional power plants, which 
became necessary to contrast the oversupply caused by national 
11 
regulations giving preferential access to the networks to renewable 
energy generated power; 
• A marked drop of wholesale prices for electricity. For the core E.ON
market, i.e. Germany, electricity prices fell from over €80 per megawatt
hour (MWh) at peak hours to about €38 per MWh in 2013. As reported by
The Economist (2013), the wholesale price of electricity even fell to minus
€100 per MWh in mid-June 2013.
• A significant fall in the value of its power generation assets, as a
consequence of the previous two points. In September 2015, the
company reported its biggest annual loss, as a result of writing down the
value of its coal- and gas-fired power plants by approximately €8.8bn.14
Overall, E.ON’s income from conventional power generation, i.e. fossil fuels and 
nuclear, fell by more than a third from 2010 to 2013.15 
E.ON’s sales and underlying net income respectively decreased in 2013 by 7% and 46%
in comparison to 2012 - see Annex 2). The company passed from an annual record loss
to another; €3.2bn loss in 2014 and €7.25bn for the year 2015.16
The impact on E.ON’s capitalisation was remarkable. As shown in Figure 3, after 
2009, the entire industry contracted in Europe (-31%), with respect to US utilities (+22%). 
An indication that the diminishing stock value was not due to a global trend (i.e. the 
financial crisis) but rather to a specific EU phenomenon, which can be largely attributed 
to the new policy framework on energy and climate. E.ON did worse than the Euro 
STOXX Utilities Index with a noteworthy contraction of 45%. 
14 Financial Times (2015), Eon reports record loss of €7.25bn as it writes down power assets, by Guy 
Chazan, 11 November 2015. 
15 See The Economist (2013), How to lose half a trillion euros – Europe’s electricity providers face an 
existential threat, 12 October 2013. 
16 Financial Times (2015): Eon reports record loss of €7.25bn as it writes down power assets, by Guy 
Chazan, 11 November 2015. 
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Figure 3 – Total Shareholder Return: U.S., EU and E.ON, 2010-2013 
Source: Thompson Reuters Datastream and E.ON Presentation, Case study Germany: Failures of the 
current market design, 2015.  
In presenting the results of the financial year 2013, the E.ON’s CEO Johannes 
Teyssen pointed out that the company’s “results clearly reflect the negative effects of a 
difficult economic and regulatory environment in Europe”17. 
3. E.ON’s response to the new regulatory environment
“We know where we are. Do we also know where we’re going?”18 
To cope with the challenges created by the new regulatory environment and to put 
a remedy to losses, the E.ON management first implemented some conventional 
measures: lobbying the national governments and the European Commission, increasing 
investment in renewables, expanding to the more attractive emerging markets and cost-
cutting. Successively, partly because such measures proved to be insufficient to redress 
financial prospects and partly because it realised that the structure of the energy 
17 E.ON (2014), E.ON stays on course in difficult environment. 
18 E.ON Annual report (2009), p.40.  
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business was changed for good, E.ON’s management decided to introduce more drastic 
measures.  In what follows, we describe this two-step response to the new business 
environment which emerged from the fast advent of renewables and low wholesale 
prices for electricity. 
3.1.  The conventional responses 
3.1.1.  Lobbying 
Electricity utilities have often used their market power to mould the sector and 
to influence final energy prices and, indirectly, investment decisions. The recent policy 
outcomes, such as the EU Climate and Energy Package, have watered down this power, 
and the  sector is “increasingly shaped by political decisions”.19 
By definition, a changing regulatory environment provides uncertainty for the business 
sector and companies actively engage with policy-makers in the attempt of minimising 
the negative impact of upcoming reforms.  
During the discussion about the definition of the EU Energy and Climate Package 
targets energy companies did lobby both at national and at the EU level. What E.ON did 
was to call for a revision of the multiple target approach, in favour of a single ambitious 
target. According to the company’s CEO “numerous targets are inefficient, contradict 
each other and are the root cause of inefficiencies. We should go for a climate [emission 
reduction] target of at least 40% – between 40% and 50% – by 2030 and we should leave 
it to the markets how to achieve that”20. In clear, E.ON was lobbying against the rollout 
of massive (and distortive) subsidies to renewables. The company was not in favour of 
strict renewable energy targets; rather, it looked favourable at a European carbon pricing 
mechanism – the EU Emissions Trading Scheme – as the main emissions mitigation 
instrument21. 
E.ON was very active in the media explaining that it was promoting energy policy
reforms. The fact that E.ON’s CEO was at the same time President of Eurelectric, the 
European association of the electricity industry, was clearly advantageous for E.ON.   
19 Łoskot-Strachota A. (2013). 
20 Van Renssen S. (2013), Interview with Johannes Teyssen, CEO of E.on: “Renewables can become 
biggest without subsidies”, Energy Post. 
21 To be noticed that the first phase of EU ETS 2005-2008 actually brought profits to large energy producers; 
profits which have been partly reinvested to expand the generation capacity from conventional sources.  
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Moreover, E.ON together with nine other major European energy producers 
(such as the German RWE, the French GDF Suez, the Italian Enel and Eni, and the Spanish 
Iberdrola Gas Natural, and others) formed the so-called informal Magritte Group to lobby 
the European Commission22. The Group claimed that the new regulatory environment 
was threatening security of supply, forcing companies to shut down power plants and 
causing increases of retail prices for end consumers. On numerous occasions, the 
Magritte Group stressed that in a European power market already struggling with 
overcapacity, overly generous subsidies for renewables led to additional waves of 
investment in solar and wind, further making existing thermal capacity uneconomical to 
run.  
More recently, in early 2014, the Magritte Group drafted a list of nine 
recommendations on how to improve the EU energy policy. It particularly, it called on 
the EU to set up a capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRM)23 that would pay utilities 
for standby capacity and would ensure backup supply. 
Whether it be on the EU ETS, renewable energy sources subsidies or CRM, E.ON 
supported a power shift from member states to the EU level. The favour for enhanced 
European integration is based on several reasons:  
• More centralised power at the EU level could have reduced the
uncertainty on the implementation of EU directives. According to E.ON,
there is too much flexibility and heterogeneity in the compliance to
regulations and directives. Member states had for example the option of
replacing a provision with “alternative measures that achieve a
comparable effect”24.
• The will to expand their business outside Germany.
• The ambition to «by-pass» the German federal policy-making, which was
not favourable to CRM and was keener on pushing for climate and
environment targets, than other EU Member State.
E.ON was explaining that the EU and the company's goals went hand in hand and
that implemented measures were in line with EU policy objectives: capacity mechanisms 
for gas-fired power plants were useful to increase security of supply and reach climate 
22 Fortum (2014), CEOs of leading European energy companies’ contribution to the European Council, 19 
March 2014. 
23 Euractiv (2013), Energy CEOs call for end to renewable subsidies, 11 October 2013.  
24 E.ON annual report (2013), p.67. 
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targets, the maintained use of nuclear energy was advantageous to keep on benefiting 
from competitive energy.   
Although well structured, as it involved lobbying at national and EU level from 
both a corporate and an industry perspective, it is rather difficult to assess the lobbying 
effort as a successful exercise. Two observations can be made in this respect, which we 
present the reader in form of questions for debate: i) Could the lobbying strategy have 
been more successful if the core of lobbying activities had come at an earlier stage, 
before the Commission’s policy proposal?; ii) Was there the possibility to lobby for a 
more diluted implementation of the push for renewables rather than focusing on pulling 
out policy targets for renewables?  
3.1.2.  Rebalancing the portfolio 
In addition to its lobbying strategy, E.ON decided to change profoundly its 
generation portfolio. In 2007, it announced it would double the planned investments in 
renewable energy sources with respect to what it had envisaged the year before; the 
new figure being €6 bn through 2010.25 The company set rather ambitious targets. In 
2008 wind power represented less than 2% of its generation capacity. The goal was set 
to 10GW of renewable capacity by 2015, more than five times its 2008 level.26 Building 
on these ambitious goals, new added capacity amounted to 0.6GW every year from 2008 
to 2012. This increase then somewhat surprisingly came to a halt in 2013 and did not 
resume in 2014.27 Nonetheless, the total added capacity in renewable generation 
equalled more than 5GW in 2014 as opposed to 2007 levels. The company was able to 
slow down the profit slump as its wind energy business gathered speed with the rapid 
build-up of offshore wind capacity in the Baltic Sea. At the end of 2013 renewable energy 
production accounted for around 12% of the company’s earnings28.  
E.ON went one step further than just investing in new renewable capacity. The
strategy for the reorientation of the energy portfolio was also influenced by the decision 
of the German Government, in the aftermath of Fukushima accident, to impose a 
progressive shut-down of nuclear power plants. The company decided to divested many 
25 E.ON Annual Report 2007. 
26 E.ON Annual Report 2008. 
27 E.ON Annual Report 2014. 
28 Energy Matters, (2014), E.ON To Split And Focus On Renewable Energy, 2 December 2014. 
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of its conventional power plants; in only four years, from 2010 to end of 2013, E.ON sold 
for €20bn of these assets.29 Furthermore, it also freezed planned investments. IN 2012, 
the company abandoned its plans to build new nuclear power stations on the island of 
Angelesey in Wales and in Oldbury-on-Severn England, a project developed together 
with its German competitor RWE. Instead, both companies agreed “that investments in 
renewable energies, decentralised generation and energy efficiency are more 
attractive”30. The bottom line was a sharp drop in nuclear (-26%) and coal (-47%) 
capacity.31 Until today, E.ON has shut down approximately 15.000MW of old coal power 
plants. According to the company’s CEO “unless the business environment of the energy 
industry in the core European markets change[ed] tangibly, other plant closures [would] 
be unavoidable” 32.  
3.1.3.  Expanding international activities 
In view of the challenges that the company faced with the adoption of the EU 
Energy and Climate Package and the subsequent measures affecting national energy 
policies in the EU-28, E.ON decided to increase its presence outside the EU market. Lower 
wholesale prices and the euro area stagnation contributed to a slowdown of growth 
projections in the European energy sector so that E.ON decided to scale up its subsidiary 
“E.ON International Energy”. The latter works with local partners “to operate renewable 
and conventional generating capacity and distribution network and sales businesses 
outside Europe.”33 The company decided to expand its activities in Turkey. The country 
had been one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, as a result of which the rise 
in its energy demand had been strong and steady. E.ON acquired half of the Turkish 
company Enerjisa – through a joint venture - under the expectation of increasing E.ON’s 
share in the Turkish energy market to 10% by 202034. The energy market in Turkey is 
more liberalised that the EU internal market, which gives E.ON greater opportunities to 
develop and bring in profits. 
29 E.ON Annual Report 2013. 
30 S. Knight (2012), E.on confirms strategy focused on renewable, Windpower Monthly, 30 March 2012. 
31 Authors’ calculation based on data available in E.ON’s 2008 to 2014 Annual Reports. 
32 Bryant C. (2013),  Eon warns of more plant closures as first-half profits fall 42%, 13 August 2013. 
33 E.ON Annual Report 2014, p.60.  
34 E.ON (2012), E.ON establishes market position in Turkey. 
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E.ON also expanded its business in one of the biggest energy markets in the world
– Russia – by investing in gas-fired plants and creating a joint-venture in western Siberia.
As part of its international expansion program in April 2012 E.ON bought a 11.7% 
stake in MPX (now Eneva S.A), controlled by the Brazilian Eike Batista, and a year after 
the two agreed on increasing E.ON’s share in the company, up to 36.2%. By signing the 
agreement with the Brazilian partner and by thus creating the largest energy company 
in the country, E.ON set foot on Latin America’s biggest economy, with a fast-rising 
demand for energy.  
In 2014, non-EU countries nonetheless accounted for only 5% of the 
company's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA). 
3.1.4.  Cost-cutting and deleveraging the balance sheet 
In 2011, E.ON’s management launched the efficiency program "E.ON 2.0" which 
aimed at achieving long-term cost reductions and a restructuring of the E.ON Group. The 
programme entailed cost-cutting measures amounting to approximately €200 million. 
The company also cut E.ON’s employee headcount “from 88,000 in 2009 to 62,000 in 
2013 and raised €19 billion in asset disposals”35. There was a large number of disposals, 
always with the aim to increase liquidity that could be used for growth sectors like 
renewables and distributed-energy solutions.  
As part of the efficiency improving program an organizational transformation of 
the company was foreseen with a cut in the number of legal entities within E.ON and the 
establishment of a flatter hierarchy36. 
  The company reorganised the German regional unit. The new organisation of 
Exploration & Production and Climate & Renewables also brought significant efficiency 
gains to the company. Furthermore, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON Energy Trading merged into 
a new branch of the company, E.ON Global Commodities SE (Societas Europaea), which 
was created in order to unite energy trading and gas activities. Such new entity would be 
in charge of taking centralized control over the global market trading operations (trading 
all sorts of commodities: gas, oil, electricity, etc.); a step towards internal integration that 
35 Barber T. (2014), Eon feels the heat of German and EU energy policies, Financial Times, 23 January 
2014. 
36 E.ON Annual Report 2013. 
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would ideally lead to the optimization of E.ON’s portfolio. This measure was supposed 
to help the company transform from a conventional European utility company into a 
global client-oriented energy solutions developer. 
After all these efforts, financial results remained disappointing and growth 
prospects depressed.  In short, could we say that these measures were necessary but not 
sufficient? 
3.2.  A radical move 
Most utilities at first adopted the option to lay low and wait for the “renewables 
storm” to blow over. As the public sector push for renewables helped renewable 
technology to reach maturity and led to an enduring market reorientation, such utilities 
have consequently paid the price of their dullness.  
Faced with diminishing returns and capitalisation, once it was clear that some of 
the changes promoted by the new European and EU national legislation were there to 
stay, the E.ON group decided to go one step further. It announced on November 30th 
2014 that it would break itself up in two clear-cut parts. The first company would retain 
the brand name “E.ON” and would target all the disruptive markets: electricity from 
renewable energy sources, electricity storage, smart grids and digitalisation. A second 
company, later named “Uniper”, would retain the conventional upstream activities and 
energy trading. 
Figure 4. Two new companies. Source: E.ON Strategy Chart 
Source: E.ON (2014), Empowering Customers. Shaping Markets, Press Conference Presentation, 1 December 2014. 
19 
In short, two smaller companies with their specific business model would replace, 
in 2016, the fully integrated mastodon. Acknowledged the changes in the value chain 
and the new energy business environment, E.ON considered that flexibility would be a 
strength. Each company would enjoy a better position to seize strategic opportunities 
and create value in its respective market. Particularly, the new E.ON would be able to 
redesign its structure and mission to be more responsive to the emerging characteristics 
of the energy business brought by the growth of renewables: customer proximity and 
interconnectivity.  
Employees, from assembly-line workers to board managers and even the CEO 
would have, according to the spin-off rationale, a clearer picture of their goal. To give an 
example of the situation as it was standing, the E.ON CEO, when flying to Brussels or 
Berlin to discuss with the policy-makers, had to address jointly nuclear decommissioning, 
the rescue of gas power plants and the renewables deployment targets.  
According to the split decision, on one side employees in the conventional 
generation business would focus on reducing operational costs and providing regular 
supply, i.e. contribute to security of supply and competitiveness. They would focus on 
global commodities and manage over 51 GW of power generation capacity in Germany, 
the UK, Sweden and Russia in order to become a European leader in power and gas. 
On the other side, the new E.ON team would come up with innovative solutions 
in order to improve its position in the wind and photovoltaic sectors, develop on-site 
generation, design energy-efficient systems for smart cities and become a leading 
provider of customers solutions. 
Figure 5, which builds on E.ON (2014), shows the characteristics of the new and 
conventional energy worlds, which the two companies are supposed to intercept and 
develop. 
Among the other alternatives that E.ON could have explored, divesting was 
probably the simpler. The group could have continued divesting at forced speed or could 
have sold conventional and/or less profitable activities at a slower pace. However, in the 
second situation, E.ON would then have faced the risk of the “dying-house construction”: 
employees would have no incentive to work and would ultimately leave the company. 
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Figure 5 – Conventional and New Energy Businesses  
 
As a whole, the spin-off and breakout seemed to be for the company a daring 
option, but somewhat unavoidable. Several points, which are out of the scope of this 
business case, still have to be clarified: Was the separation and division of business 
portfolios managed correctly? Could the new business model be reimagined differently? 
Would these two new entities have to compete? What is the corporate strategy that 
each one should now follow?  
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
The EU energy industry has been facing profound  and far-reaching changes 
with the introduction of the 2020 and then 2030 EU Climate and Energy Packages and 
implementing measures. The rapid switch to renewables as one of the up-and-coming 
pillars had dramatic effect on energy suppliers which relied on conventional generation 
and “fossil” power plants. Subsidies to the renewables production led to an oversupply 
of electricity which compressed the wholesale price. EU intervention matched with 
efforts at national level, plus technological enhancements, turned the traditional 
business environment upside down and made the integrated business model unfit for 
the redesigned energy market.  As a result, the conventional utilities faced major 
financial losses.  
E.ON, one of the largest and most powerful players on the European energy 
market, coped with the changing business environment in two steps. At first, the strategy 
Conventional Energy Business
• Systemic and Centralised Approach with Regional or Global Perspectives
• Focus on the Security of Supply
• Conventional Fossil and Nuclear Technologies
• Large Scale Operations
New Energy Business
• Customer-centric Approach with a Local Perspective
• Focus on Energy Sustainability
• Clean Technologies and Digital Applications
• Small Scale Solutions and Small Network 
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involved a set of conventional responses: i) intensification of lobbying at the national and 
European level, ii) a revision of the energy portfolio by increasing investments in 
renewable energy production, iii) expansions to non-European markets with the 
company’s international branch expanding its activities into more attractive emerging 
markets and, last but not least, iv) a far-ranging cost-cutting programme.  
In a second phase, E.ON management recognised the need to develop a new 
business model and decided to change the 100 year-old integrated model.  
With a bold move in 2014, E.ON split the company into two. Whilst it remains to 
be seen whether this decision would lead to positive outcomes for the company(ies), it 
is rather certain that by dividing the large E.ON portfolio of businesses in two more-
specialised companies, E.ON can at least glance at growth prospects anew.    
5. Questions for discussion
1. What kind of changes was E.ON confronted with?
2. What did the company’s management do to respond to the new
environment?
3. Has E.ON been wise by being radical?
4. How do you think could have proceeded with the spin-off?
5. Which other measures could have E.ON taken?
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1 – Targets by Member States proposed by the EC for 2020 
 
Obligations for 2020 Non-EU ETS target RES target 
Austria AT -16% 34% 
Belgium BE -15% 13% 
Bulgaria BG 20% 16% 
Cyprus CY -5% 13% 
Czech Republic CZ 9% 13% 
Denmark DK -20% 30% 
Estonia EE 11% 25% 
Finland FI -16% 38% 
France FR -14% 23% 
Germany DE -14% 18% 
Greece EL -4% 18% 
Hungary HU 10% 13% 
Ireland IE -20% 16% 
Italy IT -13% 17% 
Latvia LV 17% 42% 
Lithuania LT 15% 23% 
Luxembourg LU -20% 11% 
Malta MT 5% 10% 
Netherlands NL -16% 14% 
Poland PL 14% 15% 
Portugal PT 1% 31% 
Romania RO 19% 24% 
Slovakia SK 13% 14% 
Slovenia SI 4% 25% 
Spain ES -10% 20% 
Sweden SE -17% 49% 
United Kingdom UK -16% 15% 
Source: Report to DG ENV: Model-based Analysis of the 2008 EU Policy Package on Climate Change 
and Renewables 
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Annex 2 – E.ON Group Financial Highlights for 2012 and 2013 
2013 2012 +/- % 
Electricity sales 704.4 billion kWh 740.9 
billion 
kWh -5
Gas sales 1,091.7 billion kWh 1,162.1 
billion 
kWh -6
Sales 122,450 million EUR 132,093 
million 
EUR -7
EBITDA1 9,315 million EUR 10,771 
million 
EUR -14
EBIT1 5,681 million EUR 7,012 
million 
EUR -19
Net income 2,510 million EUR 2,613 
million 
EUR -4
Net income attributable to 
shareholders of E.ON SE 2,142 
million 
EUR 2,189 
million 
EUR -2
Underlying net income1 2,243 million EUR 4,170 
million 
EUR -46
Investments 8,086 million EUR 6,997 
million 
EUR +16
Cash provided by operating 
activities of continuing 
operations 
6,375 million EUR 8,808 
million 
EUR -28
Economic net debt (at year-
end) 31,991 
million 
EUR 35,845 
million 
EUR -11
Employees (at year-end) 62,239 72,083 -14
Earnings per share attributable 
to shareholders of E.ON SE2 1.12 EUR 1.15 EUR -3
1  Adjusted for extraordinary effects. 
2  Based on shares outstanding. 
Source: E.ON Annual Report, 2013. 
